Osgoode Hall Law School of York University

Osgoode Digital Commons
Articles & Book Chapters

Faculty Scholarship

2008

The 'Affected' Post-Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis Embryo
Estair Van Wagner
Osgoode Hall Law School of York University

Roxanne Mykitiuk
Osgoode Hall Law School of York University, rmykitiuk@osgoode.yorku.ca

Jeff Nisker

Source Publication:
Cartey, T., and I. Karpin (eds.) Contemporary Perspectives on Health Law and Policy, (Sydney,
Australia: Federation Press, 2008).

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/scholarly_works
Part of the Health Law and Policy Commons

Repository Citation
Wagner, Estair Van; Mykitiuk, Roxanne; and Nisker, Jeff, "The 'Affected' Post-Preimplantation Genetic
Diagnosis Embryo" (2008). Articles & Book Chapters. 1716.
https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/scholarly_works/1716

This Book Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Osgoode Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles & Book Chapters by an authorized administrator of
Osgoode Digital Commons.

3

The "Affected" Post-Preimplantation
Genetic Diagnosis Embryo 1
Estair Van Wagner, Roxanne Mykitiuk & Jeff Nisker

Introduction
The meaning of "health" is constructed from a variety of
perspectives, including biomedical, social and political, and in a
variety of sites, including human bodies and natural environments. In this chapter we suggest that the human embryo is one
such site. At first glance the in vitro embryo is not an obvious
location from which to examine such constructions; however,
we contend that an increasing focus on biomedical determinations of the "health" of the human embryo (Mykitiuk and·
Nisker, 2008b; Van Wagner, Mykitiuk and Nisker, 2008) is
significant not only in the application to human embryos themselves, but also in terms of our broader understanding of
"health" in relation to existing adults and children.
New technologies and research initiatives are shaping the
way in which we look at the embryo and what we look for
(Mykitiuk and Nisker, 2008b; Van Wagner, Mykitiuk and
Nisker, 2008). Conventionally, the term "embryo" denotes the
product of fertilisation of a human oocyte by a human sperm
generally until eight weeks' development (Warnock, 1984).
Numerous groups and individuals have attempted to characterise and describe the human embryo from perspectives such as
1

The authors are grateful to the CIHR Institute of Child and Youth
Health and Human Development for funding this research.
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ethics, religion, science or medicine, in relation to the objectives
and interests of their respective communities (Mykitiuk and
Nisker, 2008b; Van Wagner, Mykitiuk and Nisker, 2008). In Australia, the legal definition2 of "human embryo" is "a compromise
between different views and resulted from the legal imperative
to have a defined point against which legal judgments could be
made" (Australian Government, 2005: 173). Heightened interest
in defining and characterising the human embryo has resulted
from the creation and manipulation of embryos outside of
women's bodies, particularly through research related to assisted reproduction (Blake, Proctor, Johnson et al, 2002; Steptoe and
Edwards, 1978; Yuzpe, Brown, Casper et al, 1989) and genetic
testing (Handyside, Kontogianni, Hardy et al, 1990; Verlinsky,
Lifchez, Valle et al, 1990; Verlinsky, Handyside, Simpson et al,
1993; Mykitiuk and Nisker, 2008b; Van Wagner, Mykitiuk and
Nisker, 2008).
The characterisation of human embryos affects the ways
embryos may be used, by women undergoing in vitro fertilisation (IVF), or by clinicians and scientists (Mykitiuk and
Nisker, 2008b; Van Wagner, Mykitiuk and Nisker, 2008). For ins- \
tance, researchers and clinicians have emphasised selection of.
the ''best'' or "most suitable" embryo for implantation to achieve
the highest pregnancy rate while removing the risk of high order
multiple pregnancy (Mykitiuk and Nisker, 2008a; Min, Claman
and Hughes, 2006). As assisted reproductive technology (ART)
increasingly employs genetics-based techniques such as preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGO), new characterisations of
the human embryo will emerge based on the new information
made available (Mykitiuk and Nisker, 2008b; Van Wagner,
Mykitiuk and Nisker, 2008). PGO facilitates the selection of
embryos created by IVF for transfer to the woman based on the
particular criteria being tested such as the presence of genetic
2

This statement was made in relation to the definition of "human
embryo" in the Research Involving Human Embryos Act 2002 (Cth),
which has since been amended by the Prohibition of Human Cloning for

Reproduction and the Regulation of Human Embryo Research Amendment
Ad 2006 (Cth), Sch 2 (2). The point about the dependency of the legal
definition of the human embryo on different contexts remains relevant,
and perhaps is even reinforced by the context in which these changes
were made (see the discussion in Australia's Lockhart Review (Australian Senate Committee on Community Affairs, 2006)).
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markers for diseases (Handyside, Kontogianni, Hardy et al, 1990;
Nisker and Gore-Langton, 1995) or a compatible tissue match
for an existing sick sibling (Verlinsky, Rechitsky, Schoolcraft et
al, 2001). Further, as new research initiatives such as stem
cell research develop, policy-makers may characterise human
embryos in such a manner as to promote research (Mykitiuk and
Nisker, 2008b; Van Wagner, Mykitiuk and Nisker, 2008). The
purpose of this chapter is to examine the language employed
in recent policy statements and regulatory documents to
characterise the "affected" post-PGD embryo and to discuss the
interdependent relationship between how embryos are characterised and the uses and purposes which PGD serves. ln this
examination we illustrate how understandings of "health"
are produced through the research uses and clinical practice of
PGD (Mykitiuk and Nisker, 2008b; Van Wagner, Mykitiuk and
Nisker, 2008).

Background, Methods and Characterisations
Before embryo cryopreservation (Trounson and Mohr, 1983),
determinations of embryo "health" were based on morphologic
criteria, in other words, by looking at the embryo through a
microscope. Clinicians would look for features such as cell
division, absence of fragmentation, and blastomere symmetry
and clarity. These observations led to the selection of the "best"
three or more embryos, which were transferred into the woman,
the remaining embryos being discarded (Mykitiuk and Nisker,
2008b; Van Wagner, Mykitiuk and Nisker, 2008). Within the past
15 years, embryos not selected for transfer have been cryopreserved for later transfer so that the woman could avoid the risks
associated with menotropin drugs (Abramov, Ekhalal and
Schenker, 1999) and oocyte retrieval surgeries (Alsalili, Yuzpe,
Tummon et al, 1995), either of which may be employed in
additional IVF cycles (Mykitiuk and Nisker, 2008b; Van Wagner,
Mykitiuk and Nisker, 2008). At some IVF clinics today,
clinicians and scientists still use microscopic criteria to determine which embryos are the "healthiest-looking", and transfer
the "best" embryos while "fresh", in order to achieve the
highest pregnancy rate (Mykitiuk and Nisker, 2008b; Van Wagner, Mykitiuk and Nisker, 2008). In fact there is no evidence that
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an embryo's potential to become a child can be conclusively
determined using morphologic characteristics viewable through
a microscope. There is in fact evidence to the contrary (Tekpetey, Hughes, Shepherd et al, 2003).
The number of gene markers identified through PGD is
rapidly expanding and provides another context in which determinations of the "best" or "healthy" embryo are being made
(Lau and Leung, 2005). Such biomedical characteristics may be
used to prevent the birth of a child who may suffer from a particular perceived "health" problem, or to positively select characteristics of a potential child (Levy, 2002; Mykitiuk and Nisker,
2008b; Van Wagner, Mykitiuk and Nisker, 2008). The focus of
this chapter is on the "post-PGD embryo" - those embryos that
have been tested using PGD. As our analysis demonstrates, the
genetic information available through PGD and the intention
behind diagnosis lead to several possible categorisations of the
post-PGD embryo (Van Wagner, Mykitiuk and Nisker, 2008).
Our research focuses on four jurisdictions: the United
Kingdom, Australia, Canada and New Zealand. We consider
legislative, policy, scientific and research documents relating to
PGD. These documents construct the regulation of PGD as part
of the governance of ART - the use of in vitro human embryos. In
the jurisdictions examined here, PGD is governed by "facilitative" legislative regimes, which establish "broad legislative
frameworks" (Human Genome Research Project (HGRP), 2006:
302) in which decision-making powers are delegated to statutory
and/or professional bodies. We argue that the documents examined here serve an important, but under-examined function in
shaping the clinical practice and scientific application of PGD.
Our examination will analyse the precise language through
which characterisations of the post-PGD embryo occur. Further,
we explore how resulting use or non-use of post-PGD embryos
relate to understandings of "health" in the context of ART and
embryo research (Van Wagner, Mykitiuk and Nisker, 2008).
Five possible characterisations of the post-PGD embryo
emerge from our analysis. These characterisations include: 1)
affected; 2) unaffected; 3) carrier; 4) sex-selected; and 5) HLA
tissue-typed (Van Wagner, Mykitiuk and Nisker, 2008). The
focus of this chapter is on the affected post-PGD embryo and
how this determination is made in relation to what is considered
40
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an unaffected post-PGD embryo.3 These characterisations are
not mutually exclusive as the post-PGD embryo may exist within multiple categories at once, or change from one to another
depending on the uses to which it may or may not be put.

The Unaffected Embryo
PGD enables clinicians to identify embryos as "affected" or "unaffected", allowing women undergoing IVF treatment to choose
"embryos that are predicted to be unaffected" (HGC, 2006: 44)
for implantation. This selection "provides an opportunity to
begin a pregnancy knowing that only unaffected embryos have
been transferred" (HFEA and ACGT, 2000: 8). The unaffected
embryo is said to be "suitable" to be transferred or implanted in
light of its status as "disease-free" (CBS, 2005a: 2), "without"
(HGC, 2004: 10), or "free" (NECAHR, 2004: 3) of a genetic disorder or "chromosomal abnormality" (HGC, 2004: 18), not
having "a copy of the faulty gene" (HFEA, 2005: 7), "not carry[ing] markers for the condition in question" (HCARO, 2005: 1),
"not known to have such an abnormality" (HFE Bill: s 14(4)(9))
or "not hav[ing] the particular gene mutation" (CBS, 2005a: 4).
After PGD is completed there may be more embryos than
are required for immediate transfer. Current practice in some
jurisdictions (ACART, 2006: 12; HGRP, 2006: 47, 52) is to keep
the number of embryos transferred to a minimum. As PGD
necessarily involves the creation of embryos for genetic analysis
(CBS, 2005a: 4), one of its more controversial aspects is what
happens to the embryos created which are not transferred to the
woman. As with all IVF embryos, post-PGD "remaining" (CBS,
2005a: 5), "supernumerary" (CBS, 2005b: 2), "spare" (STC, 2005:
23; HGRP, 2006: 47), "surplus" (ACART, 2006: 13; HGRP, 2006:
47) or "excess" (Research Involving Human Embryos Act 2002 (Cth)
(RIHE Act) s 7(1)) embryos are those "no longer required"
(Australian Government, 2005: 7) for the reproductive purposes
for which they were created. The manner in which embryos are
classified as one of the five characterisations differs across jurisdictions, as do the ways in which they may be used for
3

The authors explore all five themes in more detail elsewhere see Van
Wagner, Mykitiuk and Nisker, 2008.
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reproductive or research purposes.4 Unaffected embryos "remaining" (CBS, 2005a: 33), could be "destroyed" (CBS, 2005a, 2005b;
HGRP, 2006: 163), stored (STC, 2005: 23; HFEA, 2005: 7; HFE
Bill: s 15(2)(b)(ab)),5 "used for research purposes" (HGRP, 2006:
163) or donated to "another individual" (STC, 2005: 23) for "reproductive purposes" (CBS, 2005b: 33; Van Wagner, Mykitiuk
and Nisker, 2008).
While policy documents and legislation do not use "healthy"
as a general descriptor of the unaffected embryo, they have used
the term in discussions about the disposition of embryos not to
be used for reproductive purposes, either because there are additional unaffected embryos, which are not needed for implantation, or because PGD is being employed to select a tissue-match
or avoid a carrier embryo (HGC, 2006: 14, 51, 52; HGRP, 2006: 21,
43; NHMRC, 2007b: 42). These situations are framed as creating
an ethical dilemma with respect to the disposal or use of
"healthy", or unaffected embryos, which implies that the disposal or use of an affected post-PGD embryo does not pose the
same ethical issues (Van Wagner, Mykitiuk and Nisker, 2008).
We contend that an assessment or characterisation of
"health" based on the outcome of PGD is problematic because
only specific, limited genetic markers are identified, and therefore, "health" is understood as the absence of these markers and
the medical conditions they are associated with in living persons
(Van Wagner, Mykitiuk and Nisker, 2008). "PGD is not a guarantee of a healthy baby" (HGRP, 2006: 17, 52), and as the
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA) in the
UK has indicated, through the use of PGD, "the woman makes a
decision about suitability based on information about the
genetic status of the embryo" (2005: 9), which is only one of
many factors in the overall health of a child.

The Affected Embryo
An embryo will be considered "affected" if the presence of a
genetic "anomaly" (CBS, 2005a: 1), "mutation" (HGRP, 2006: 1)
4

For a more detailed account see Van Wagner, Mykitiuk and Nisker,
2008.

5

This section pertains to the storage of embryos generally.
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or an "abnormality" (Australian Government, 2005: 120; HFE
Bill: s 14(4)(9), Sch 2.5.3 para IZA) has been detected through
PGD. Under the current practice of PGD, such information is
used to identify embryos affected by "serious, life threatening
conditions" (HGRP, 2006: 5), "a genetic disease" (ACART, 2006:
13), a "serious genetic disorder" (HGC, 2004), "serious genetic
defects" (Australian Government, 2005), "genetic abnormality or
disease" (ITA, 2006b), "serious genetic abnormality or a disease"
(Human Reproductive Technology Act 1991 (WA) s 14(2b)(a)(ii)) or
"genetic conditions incompatible with life, or with a life of
quality" (STC, 2005: 28). In the jurisdictions we examined, PGD
is currently applied to diagnose X-linked conditions, "numerical
chromosomal abnormalities" (CBS, 2005a: 4; HGRP, 2006: 3, 37;
NECAHR, 2004: 4), specific gene mutations or "single-gene
defects" (NECAHR, 2004: 4).

Defining "serious"
The term "serious" is invoked in a number of jurisdictions as a
threshold between current and acceptable uses of PGD and
those characterised as "trivial or [for] social reasons" (HGC,
2004: 19; HGRP, 2006: 46; Van Wagner, Mykitiuk and Nisker,
2008). Despite widespread use of the term in this way, there is
no common or specific definition of "serious" in any of the four
jurisdictions we examined (HCARO, 2005; HGC, 2004: 22;
HGRP, 2006: 236; NECAHR, 2004: 9; NHMRC, 2007b: 42).
The HFEA' s Code of Practice states that PGD will be offered
"only where there is a significant risk of a serious genetic
condition being present in the embryo" (HFEA, 2003: 123). The
HFE Bill, being reviewed by Committee as of May 2008 would
amend the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 (UK)
to restrict "embryo testing" for "gene, chromosome or mitochondrial abnormality" and sex-linked conditions (HFE Bill:
s 14(4)(9), s 14(4)(10)) to cases where "there is a significant risk
that a person with the abnormality will have or develop a
serious physical or mental disability, a serious illness or any
other serious medical condition" (Bill Sch 2.5.3 para lZA(l)(a),
(2)). In a 2005 report on the application of PGD for "lower penetrance susceptibility conditions", the HFEA stated, "(h]ow
serious a condition is depends on how having the condition
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affects, threatens or limits the life of the individual" (2005: 11).
According to the report, a condition that will not "cause someone to suffer or detrimentally affect their life" would be
"unlikely to be regarded as serious", while a condition that
requires "regular invasive treatment, or was life-limiting or life
threatening" would be (HFEA, 2005: 11). The HFEA has since
announced a policy approving the use of PGD to detect the
BRCA 1, BRCA 2, and HNPCC genes.6 This change arguably
opened up a wider application of PGD than that allowed by the
previous HFEA position, which had largely limited the practice
to detection of high penetrance7 and early onset conditions
(Krahn, 2007: 1445; Van Wagner, Mykitiuk and Nisker, 2008).
The HFEA does not provide a definition for "serious",
instead leaving it to "discussion between the people seeking
treatment and the clinical team" (HFEA, 2003: 123). It provides
no formal list of "serious" conditions for which PGD is permitted, but in practice, because of its licensing procedure, particular
PGD applications form an "accepted list of conditions" (STC,
2005). The Code of Practice outlines factors to be considered in
determining when PGD is appropriate, including the perspective of the woman, or couple, the family situation, as well as
the nature of the specific condition in question (HFEA, 2003:
123). While the original Draft Bill would have amended the
HFEA Act to require the consideration of five factors in determining whether embryo testing is "necessary or desirable",
neither the woman's nor her partner's perspective, nor their
family circumstances were included (2007: s 59 Sch 2 para
1ZA(3)). This provision was not included in the HFE Bill now
under consideration by Parliament.
In Australia the regulation of PGD falls under State jurisdiction; however, several States employ the Commonwealth regulatory regime on embryo research governed by the NHMRC's
6

See Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority, "HFEA - Autho-

7

rity decision on PGD policy", available at <www.hfea.gov.uk/cps/
rde/xchg/SID-3F57D79B-FDBD411B/hfea/hs.xsV1124.html> (last accessed 28 May 2007).
The penetrance of BRCA mutations in the Ashkenazi Jewish community is very high. It is almost 80 per cent (Struewing, Abeliovich,
Peretz et al, 1995; Tonin, Mes-Masson, Futreal et al, 1995; Wamer,
Foulkes, Goodwin et al, 1999).
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Ethical Guidelines. This regime restricts PGD to conditions that
"seriously harm" (NHMRC, 2007b: para 12.2). Some States do
have specific legislation pertaining to ART and PGD. Western
Australia's Reproductive Technology Council (RTC) states that
the "seriousness of a genetic disease should be considered in the
broad context of the environmental and personal factors of the
participants" (RTC, 2004: 3). Licence applications for PGD contain the report of a "clinical geneticist" that addresses a number
of factors including: the family's "experience with, and attitude
to" the condition; the "level of impairment to body functions and
structures that is usually associated"; the difficulties expected in
"participating in activities such as learning and applying
knowledge, communication, mobility, self-care, employment,
community, social and civic life"; the "level of support" required
and the "capacity of the family" to provide it; and the "prospects
for new and longer term treatments and interventions for the
condition" (RTC, 2004: 4-5; Van Wagner, Mykitiuk and Nisker,
2008).
The PGD policy of the ITA in Victoria employs the criteria
set out ins 8(3) of the Infertility Treatment Act 1995 that a "genetic
abnormality or disease might be transmitted to a person born",
but it does not define these terms (ITA, 2006b). The policy
"entrusts" this determination to "the specialist with qualifi·
cations in human genetics", explicitly placing the physician in
the role of "gatekeeper" with respect to PGD (ITA, 2006b: [4.2]).
The ITA's approach to the regulation of PGD includes using
a schedule of "Approved Genetic Testing", which outlines "routine" uses that do not require notification of application
(ITA, 2006a).8 The ITA also sets out uses that "require approval
on a case by case basis", such as sex-linked conditions involving
"inconclusive evidence about the transmission of that
8

List A of the schedule to the Act discusses the "Use of PCD where
women have already been admitted for treatment and where the pur·
poses of PCD is to detect chromosomal imbalances in the cases:
recurrent implantation failure; recurrent miscarriage; advanced mater·
nal age; previous history of fetal aneuploidy; known carriers of
chromosomal rearrangements". List B covers "Current use of PGD in
Victoria where further notification to the Infertility Treatment Authority is not required": known carriers of chromosomal anomalies; determination of embryonic sex in certain specific conditions; and particular
heritable single gene disorders.
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condition", including Autism and Asperger's Syndrome (ITA,
2006a: List C). Conditions not listed in the schedule would
require "prospective notification" to the authority (ITA, 2006a:
5). Approval for PGD in these circumstances requires fulfilment
of the s 8(3) criteria as determined by a doctor specialising in
genetics (ITA, 2006b: [6a] [6c]).
In Canada, access to PGD "is currently controlled by the
medical profession" (CBS, 200Sa: 2); however, "there are no
Canadian standards or professional guidelines relating to the
use of PGD in Canada" (HCARO, 2005: 6). Without formal regulation, decisions concerning PGD are made privately by the
woman, or couple, and the doctor (CBS, 2005a: 2). Health
Canada's report on the regulation of PGD distinguishes use for
"medical/health reasons" from use for "non-health related traits,
such as hair or eye colour". They use the "serious condition"
standard as a generally accepted limitation to PGD, but acknowledge that seriousness would be "difficult to define" and that
"there are many complex factors that need to be accounted for in
this definition" (HCARO, 2005: 11; Van Wagner, Mykitiuk and
Nisker, 2008).
New Zealand's PGD guidelines state that in order to
perform PGD for "familial single gene", "familial sex-linked"
(NECAHR, 2005: 5 s 2.4) and "familial chromosomal" disorders
(NECAHR, 2005: 5), there should be "evidence that the future
individual may be seriously impaired as a result of the disorder''
(NECAHR, 2005: ss 1.3, 2.4, 3.2). Seriousness is not defined, but
the guidelines provide that "[i]t is the responsibility of PGD
providers, in collaboration with a clinical geneticist, to determine
whether a disorder is likely to be serious in the offspring"
(NECAHR, 2005). In this situation, the woman and her family do
not participate in the determination of "seriousness" (Van
Wagner, Mykitiuk and Nisker, 2008).
One can critique the "seriousness" standard from a number
of perspectives:
Although PGD can confirm the presence of a genetic anomaly, it cannot predict the extent to which the in vitro
embryo, if transferred into the womb and born alive, would
be affected as a child or adult. (CBS, 2005a: 2)
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This uncertainty becomes particularly problematic when
PGD is used to diagnose "later onset" disorders such as Alzheimer's or "low penetrant" conditions (HCARO, 2005: 11; HGRP,
2006: 50). Further, understandings of what constitutes "suffering", what one might consider "detrimental effects", or a "life
limiting" or "threatening" condition, are subjective and dependent on numerous factors relating to both the individuals and
family involved, along with the particular condition at issue
(HGRP, 2006: 37). The HFEA itself suggests that "these factors
may be difficult to predict before the affected person is born"
(2005: 11; Van Wagner, Mykitiuk and Nisker, 2008).
Evidence suggests that:
People with genetic disorders, their families and professionals have different views about which conditions give rise
to a poor quality of life. In general, those who have a direct
experience of living with a genetic disorder are likely to rate
the quality of their lives more highly than would medically
qualified professionals. (HGRP, 2006: 37)
The approach of the HFEA and Western Australia of considering the perceptions of the people seeking IVF and PGD
in defining "seriousness", illustrates the subjectivity of such a
determination (Van Wagner, Mykitiuk and Nisker, 2008). While
the STC legislative review dismissed the use of the word
"eugenics" by its critics "as an emotive term of abuse to obscure
rational debate" (STC, 2005: 55), concerns about who defines
what a "serious" condition is, and on what basis, have not been
adequately addressed by either law or policy in any of the
jurisdictions examined. Rather than confronting the complexity
of the shifting nature of determining "seriousness" and its
consequences, we contend that current legal and policy
approaches ignore subjective considerations in favour of
"medical" or "scientific" criteria. This focus seems to imply that
"seriousness" can be defined outside the context of the lives and
experiences of those undergoing ART and PGD (Van Wagner,
Mykitiuk and Nisker, 2008).
The HGRP points out that in New Zealand, legislation and
policy decisions have given professionals involved in PGD "a
broad mandate to determine what constitutes a disorder that
could cause serious impairment in a future child, and the likelihood of it happening" (2006: 236). The HGRP distinguishes
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between the role of clinicians in determining the "likelihood of
a disorder manifesting in prospective offspring", which they
view as "generally unproblematic", and their role in stating
"what constitutes a serious disorder" (HGRP, 2006: 236). This
latter determination involves both "objective" considerations,
including the age at which a disease emerges and the possibility
of prevention and/or therapy, and "subjective" considerations,
including the "experience of the prospective parents in relation
to the condition" (HGRP, 2006: 236). Their report discusses the
possibility that "by leaving such decisions in the hands of
treating clinicians, rather than in those seeking the procedure,
PGD cannot be represented as providing greater autonomy and
reproductive freedom" (HGRP, 2006: 236).
Basing decisions about PGD on a "discussion between the
people seeking treatment and the clinical team" is presented as
a way to balance "respecting the views of those seeking PGD"
and "preventing the use of technology for purposes that are
widely considered to be unacceptable" (HFEA, 2005: 12). While
we support the primacy of a woman's role in determining what
reproductive choices are best for her and her family, we caution
that respect for reproductive autonomy should not be invoked
to allow policy-makers and clinicians to avoid complex and
difficult questions about the potential implications ot reproductive and genetic technologies on conceptions of "health" and
"normalcy" (Van Wagner, Mykitiuk and Nisker, 2008). Questions about how the use of technologies such as PGD may affect
social norms and ideas about family and being human (HGC,
2004: 20) or about how "reproductive choices are being made
against a background of inadequate social support for, and
widespread discrimination against, disabled people and people
with genetic disorders" (HGC, 2004: 22 5.8) should not be
obscured or limited to private discussions in the realm of the
clinic (Van Wagner, Mykitiuk and Nisker, 2008).

What happens to the affected emb1110?
Upon being identified as "affected", the post-PGD embryo
is constructed to be incompatible with reproduction. Characterised as "unsuitable" (Australian Government, 2005: 169; STC,
2005: 23) or "unfit" (Australian Government, 2005: 175), the

L
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affected embryo is generally assumed to be "discarded" (Australian Government, 2005: xvi; CBS, 2005a: 5, 7, 22; HFEA and
ACCT, 2000: 8; HGRP, 2006: 7, 55, 320; NECAHR, 2004: 7),
"allowed" (HFEA, 2005: 7) or "left" (CBS, 2005a) to perish, or
that PGD will result in their "disposal" (HFEA and ACCT, 2000:
8) or "destruction" (HCC, 2004: 45; HGRP, 2006: 163). As the
recent legislative review in Australia found:
Under current arrangements, embryos that are not suitable
for implantation for any reason, including embryos that are
found to have a genetic disease using preimplantation genetic diagnosis, are allowed to die and are not available for
research. (Australian Government, 2005: 168)
However, recent debates in Australia suggest that the designation of "affected" embryo, may signal a shift in an embryo's
purpose and/or value (Van Wagner, Mykitiuk and Nisker, 2008).
On one hand, the value of an affected embryo for reproductive
purposes is diminished, as it is assumed that the intention
behind undergoing the diagnostic procedure is the avoidance of
the transfer of an embryo affected by the genetic condition being
tested for (Australian Government, 2005: 120; ITA, 2006b: {3]).
On the other hand, however, the affected embryo becomes
valuable in the context of research and training (Australian
Government, 2005: xvi). Indeed, a recent ACART consultation
on embryo research in New Zealand specifically discussed postPGD embryos as one source of surplus embryos for research
purposes (ACART, 2006: 13).
Just as for non-PGD embryos (Nisker and White, 2005), our
research suggests that attempts to characterise post-PGD
embryos may be driven by both the increasing demand for
embryos for research purposes and ethical concerns about the
use of human embryos (see discussions in Australian Government, 2005; CBS, 2005a; Van Wagner, Mykitiuk and Nisker,
2008). ACART proposes using post-PGD embryos for research,
as "they may never be transferred to a woman's uterus"
(ACART, 2006: 13). The presumption that post-PGD affected
embryos would otherwise be "discarded" (Australian Government, 2005: xvi) featured prominently in the 2005 Australian
legislative review. The RIHE Act has since undergone major
amendments with respect to the availability of affected embryos
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for research pursuant to the Prohibition of Human Cloning for
Reproduction and the Regulation of Human Embryo Research Amendment Act 2006 (Cth) (Patterson Act). A number of submissions
made to the legislative review committee pointed to the lack of
clarity in the RIHE Act on the status of post-PGD embryos
deemed "unsuitable for implantation" (Australian Government,
2005: xvi, 31, 38, 76, 169).9 Several parties 10 argued that post-PGD
affected embryos should not be considered simply as "excess"
embryos subject to the same consent and donation process
outlined in the "ART Guidelines" that applies to embryos created by IVF, but which the couple no longer needs for
reproduction (see NHMRC, 2004: (17.17]). Rather, parties argued
that through policy and legal reforms to avoid their characterisation as "excess", such post-PGD affected embryos could be
made available as "fresh" embryos for research and training
(Australian Government, 2005: 120).
Submissions to the Review Committee consistently suggested that "fresh embryos" were "required" (Australian Government, 2005: 37) and that "abnormally fertilised" and "unsuitable" embryos "should be made available for research and training" (Van Wagner, Mykitiuk and Nisker, 2008). The Committee
recommended that post-PGD embryos "diagnosed ... as being
unsuitable for implantation should be permitted to be used
under licence for research, training and improvements in clinical
practice" (Australian Government, 2005: xvii). This recommendation was specifically aimed at addressing the unavailability of
"fresh" (Australian Government, 2005: 38) embryos resulting
from the 14-day "cooling-off" (Australian Government, 2005: 37)
period applied to donations of "excess" embryos following IVF
(NECAHR, 2004: s 17.7), which would be frozen and stored for
14 days before becoming available for research. The Committee
relied on the assumption that affected embryos would "normally
9

The review notes that the lack of clarity does not necessarily exist in
the States that have independent legislation in place to govern ART
and PGD (2005, 169).
10 For the most part, parties made confidential submissions to the
committee. Submissions made openly available include those made by:
The Plunkett Centre for Ethics, Submission LRCSSO; Professor Martin
Pera et al, Monash University, Submission LRC509 and Sydney IVF,
Submission LRC 819. All are available online at <www.lockhart
review.com.au/submissions.html> (last accessed 10 May 2007}.
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be discarded" (Australian Government, 2005: 120), as they were
deemed unsuitable for reproductive purposes, and therefore,
that they need not be subject to "proper consent" procedures.
Using post-PGD embryos as a source of "fresh" embryos for
research raises concerns that determinations made by those practicing PGD will be influenced by the demand for research
embryos. Increased comfort with production of embryos
through IVF for research purposes may serve to justify the
expansion of PGD's application and to narrow the definition of a
"suitable" or "unaffected" embryo in the interests of ensuring
"fresh" embryos are available. In tum, our understanding of
what kinds of conditions are compatible, or incompatible, with
reproduction and health may be further shifted to exclude
particular genetic characteristics (Van Wagner, Mykitiuk and
Nisker, 2008).
Throughout the documents we surveyed, the presumption
of selection against embryos affected by genetic conditions is
widespread, despite ongoing debate about the implications
of using PGD to make such determinations and the lack of
transparency in deciding to which conditions PGD should be
applied. Distinctions are being made between embryos to be
used for reproduction and affected embryos based on problematic assumptions about the use and purposes of reproductive
technologies (Van Wagner, Mykitiuk and Nisker, 2008). The
assumption that "reproductive use" inherently means selecting
an embryo free of a particular genetic condition or abnormality
(Australian Government, 2005: 120) subtly shifts the meaning of
reproductive use to exclude the conditions for which PGD is
licensed and applied. However, it is the process of PGD itself,
and the characterisations and determinations of clinicians about
the presence of particular genetic markers or abnormalities in
the post-PGD embryo, which construct the resulting lack of
suitability in the embryo. In doing so, PGD and those applying
it redefine reproduction to exclude the affected embryo (Van
Wagner, Mykitiuk and Nisker, 2008).

Legislating suitability: the unsuitable embryo in law
The Patterson Act amends the RIHE Act, authorising modifications to the "proper consent" requirements for licenses to use
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"unsuitable" embryos. The Act now defines "unsuitable for
implantation, in relation to a human embryo" ins 7(1) in the following manner:
(a)

is diagnosed by preimplantation genetic diagnosis as
unsuitable for implantation, in accordance with the
Ethical Guidelines on the Use of Assisted Reproductive
Technology in Clinical Practice and Research (2004),

(b)

issued by the CEO of the NHMRC; or
is determined to be unsuitable for implantation in
the body of a woman, in accordance with objective
criteria specified in guidelines issued by the CEO of
the NHMRC under the NHMRC Act 1992 and prescribed by the regulations for the purposes of this
paragraph.

The amendment directly responds to the Review's recommendations that ART embryos be deemed unsuitable according to
"objective criteria", and through the use of PGD to detect
"serious genetic defects" (Australian Government, 2005: xvi). 11
The Lockhart Review distinguishes objective determinations of
PGD from the subjective nature of determining "when the
embryo appears less healthy" (Australian Government, 2005:
17). The RIHE Act now legally sanctions PGD as an objective
means of distinguishing the suitable embryo from the unsuitable (Van Wagner, Mykitiuk and Nisker, 2008).
Both the Lockhart recommendations, and now the amended
law, imply that "health" is understood as the absence of the
genetic conditions identified by PGD (Van Wagner, Mykitiuk
and Nisker, 2008). This assumption about "health" allows the
Review to avoid debate on the limitations of the genetic determinations of health (NECAHR, 2004: 14), as well as on the
implications of PGD for people living with disabilities
(NECAHR, 2004: 40, 61). Framing PGD as an "objective" way to
determine "suitability", the Review fails to acknowledge and
deal with the subjective factors that influence clinical decisions
11

The NHMRC has issued guidelines on the "objective criteria" on
which decisions about suitability for implantation are to be made
based on morphologic characteristics. They can be found online at:
<www .nhmrc.gov .au/embryos/stemcells/_files/objective_criteria.pdf>
(last accessed 23 June 2008). "Contextual Information" to these guidelines is available online at: <www.nhmrc.gov.au/embryos/stemcells
/_files/contextual_info.pdf> (last accessed 23 June 2008).
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about when PGD should be applied, and for what purposes
(Van Wagner, Mykitiuk and Nisker, 2008). The Review relies on
the assumption that affected embryos would "never" (Australian Government, 2005: 120) be used for reproductive purposes
to justify their availability to researchers.
We suggest that, in light of the problematic nature of defining and describing "seriousness", "health" and "quality of life"
with respect to genetic conditions, it is the application of PGD
itself which produces the inevitability that embryos with
particular genetic conditions will never be transferred to the
woman, not the inherent or biomedical incompatibility of particular genetic characteristics with reproduction (Van Wagner,
Mykitiuk and Nisker, 2008). The new law of Australia makes the
practice of ART professionals in administering PGD the source
of an "objective" (Australian Government, 2005: 169) assessment
of suitability. Such determinations become the means through
which "fresh" embryos are made available for "research, training and improvements in clinical practice" (Australian Government, 2005: 169; Van Wagner, Mykitiuk and Nisker, 2008).
Section 24 of the RIHE Act sets out the licensing requirements for researchers to use excess ART embryos. The amended
sub-s (8) states that a licence may provide for a modified
application of the proper consent guidelines to the use of
"unsuitable" embryos (s 8(a)). The amendment does not specifically remove the cooling-off period for post-PGD affected
embryos, as recommended by the Lockhart Review; however, it
includes the following note: "[f]or example, the guidelines could
apply to a particular licence in a modified form, to alter the
cooling-off period required in relation to the use of excess ART
embryos that are unsuitable for implantation" (Patterson Act
s 24(8)).

Conclusion
While much of the focus µi debates about research on in vitro
embryos has centred on whether an embryo's moral status
should be affected by the processes through which an embryo
has been created and the intention behind that creation (CBS,
2005a: 36), our analysis suggests another source of distinction is
emerging through the use of PGD - one which determines moral
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and ethical status on the basis of the embryo's genetic
classification as "affected" or "unaffected" by genetic conditions (Van Wagner, Mykitiuk and Nisker, 2008). Driven by the
need for sources of embryos, particularly "fresh" embryos, for
research and training activities, assumptions about the objectivity and the purposes of PGD are allowing clinicians,
researchers and policy-makers to circumvent debates about the
social dimensions of (re)defining reproduction to exclude a
growing number of genetic characteristics and conditions (Van
Wagner, Mykitiuk and Nisker, 2008). The consequences of this
conceptual shift could be profound for people living with
disabilities, their families and broader society. Scholars and
policy-makers must expose assumptions behind notions of
health, normalcy and reproductive choice, and must examine
them to ensure that new practices and technologies benefit all
women and their families, not just those who fit within the status
quo.
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